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We examine a run from smaller to the largest banks in Brazil 
during the international financial turmoil in late 2008. Since 
Brazilian banks had no exposure to subprime securitized 
loans, the run is an opportunity to observe depositor reaction 
to a shock that is exogenous to the domestic banking system. 
Our empirical strategy allows us to disentangle the too big to 
fail benefit from the other features continuously related to 
size. Our unique database allows us to observe the behavior of 
uninsured deposits and of different types of holders of 
certificates of deposits, such as individuals, institutional 
investors and non-financial corporations. Taken together, our 
results are consistent with the idea that depositors ran from 
the smaller banks to the largest banks because they believed 
the largest banks were too big to fail. We also find that 
institutional investors had an important role in inducing the 
behavior of other depositors during the crisis: banks that had 
relatively more deposits of institutional investors ex-ante 
suffered more deposit outflows throughout the crisis. 
Key Words: banking system, financial crisis, too big to fail 
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"In trying to stabilize the financial system, 
we have led creditors of large financial 
institutions to expect that the government 
will protect them from losses, which in turn 
means they need not monitor risk-taking by 
these firms." 
Charles Plosse, President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia at a policy 
forum sponsored by the Philadelphia Fed on 
Dec. 4, 2009
1. 
The crisis that started in the U.S. subprime sector in 2007 led to bailouts of large 
financial institutions in the US and Europe in late 2008 and early 2009. These bailouts 
brought the too big to fail policy back to the spotlight. Governments usually justify 
bailing out large financial institutions based on the harmful consequences of the failure 
of one large institution for the whole financial system. On the other hand, Finance 
researchers agree that a too big to fail policy is harmful to the long-run financial market 
stability because it distorts competition in the banking sector and weakens the incentives 
for creditors to monitor banks, which leads to moral hazard (Kaufman, 1990; Stern and 
Feldman, 2004; Gropp, Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010; Keister, 2010). 
The empirical literature has examined the effect of bail-out policies on the risk-taking of 
banks (Boyd and Runkle, 1993, Schnabel, 2009), and the response of the capital 
markets to banks becoming too big to fail (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990; Brewer and 
Jagtiani, 2009). The empirical literature has not yet examined – to our knowledge – if 
the perception of a too big to fail policy affects depositor behavior. In other words: do 
depositors favor banks considered too big to fail regardless of their risk fundamentals? 
This paper addresses this question by examining a run from smaller banks to the largest 
banks in Brazil during the international financial turmoil in late 2008. This flight to size 
is an opportunity to observe depositor reaction to a shock that is exogenous to the 
domestic banking system, since Brazilian banks had no exposure to subprime 
securitized loans. Specifically, we investigate if the depositor behavior may be credited 
to the perception of an implicit too big to fail policy. Our empirical strategy aims at 
ruling out the different reasons why depositors may have benefitted from putting their 
money in larger banks. Previous empirical studies on market discipline have found that 
                                                            
1 This quote can be seen in Sloan (2009). 
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depositors favor larger banks, but they did not differentiate between the too big to fail 
effect and other potential benefits of size (eg. Maechler and McDill, 2006; Imai, 2006). 
Our unique bank level information, collected in close consultation with the financial 
supervisor, enables us to compare the behavior of uninsured depositors versus the total 
set of depositors. In addition, information on the type of holder of certificates of deposit 
allows us to identify differences in behavior of institutional investors, individual 
investors and non financial firms.  
Taken together, our results are consistent with the idea that depositors ran from the 
smaller banks (hereafter, other banks) to the largest banks of Brazil (hereafter, big 
banks) during the most critical period of the international financial crisis because 
depositors believed the largest banks were too big to fail. The run was triggered by the 
bad news from the global banking industry in late 2008 and it was reverted after the 
turmoil passed. This observation strengthens the interpretation that the run was not 
based on fundamentals. We observe no systematic difference in the change in deposits 
for big banks in normal times, indicating that the competitive advantage of being too big 
to fail is most valuable during a crisis. The run is more pronounced for uninsured 
depositors, rather than for the total set of depositors, as was already expected. Our 
estimates are both statistically and economically significant. They imply that, after 
controlling for several sources of bank heterogeneity, including asset size and economic 
fundamentals, big banks increased uninsured deposits, on average, by approximately 48 
percentage points more than other banks during the critical stage of the crisis. This 
expected additional increment amounts to approximately 37 percentage points for total 
deposits. 
Our analysis of changes in certificates of deposit (CDs) by investor type provides 
interesting results as well. The amount of CDs held by institutional investors in big 
banks increased 30% in the last 6 months of 2008, while in the other banks there was a 
decrease of almost 35% in the CDs held by these investors. We also observe a similar 
movement for CDs of non financial firms: an increase of 55% in big banks and a 
decrease of 11% in other banks. When we control for bank fundamentals and the degree 
of dependence on institutional investors, we find that big banks enjoyed a change in the 
amount of CDs of institutional investors that was 57 percentage points larger than other 
banks. The effect for the CDs of non-financial firms is lower than for institutional 
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investors, but still important: a 40 percentage points increase in the amount of 
certificates of deposits in big banks relative to the other banks. 
Our inferences are robust to different specifications of the set of big banks; that is, 
whether they include only the largest government-owned banks or the largest privately-
owned banks. 
Our primary contribution to the literature is to show that even an implicit too big to fail 
policy may be readily perceived by depositors. Our findings also contribute to the 
financial crisis empirical literature by showing that the presence of institutional 
investors played an important role in the run in Brazil. We find that each incremental 
percent point of assets being funded by CDs of institutional investors resulted in an 
outflow of 2.8% of both uninsured and total deposits during the crisis (we find no such 
effect for the other periods). Interestingly, the flow in CDs held by non-financial firms 
was also negatively influenced by the reliance on institutional investors. This result is in 
line with the evidence from mutual funds outflow found in Chen, Goldstein and Jiang 
(2010) and with some features of the model for bank runs of Goldstein and Pauzner 
(2005).  
Finally, since the run was reverted after the turmoil and it did not quite reflect 
depositors’ reassessment of bank fundamentals, our findings seem to support the view 
that a run may occur when depositors learn information from other banking systems, 
which may serve as a noisy signal on domestic bank-specific information. This result is 
consistent with some features of the bank runs model of Chen (1999) and Chen and 
Hassan (2008). 
This research contributes to the financial literature for two main reasons: (1) it 
disentangles the continuous benefits of size from the discontinuous benefit of being 
perceived as too big to fail; (2) it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to 
document a massive flow of deposits to large banks, that is best explained by depositors 
anticipating possible bailouts of the large banks rather than by worse fundamentals of 
the smaller banks. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I lays out the motivation for 
our study. Section II introduces the empirical strategy. Section III discusses the data and 
sample selection. Section IV presents the results, Section V describes some robustness 
checks and Section VI concludes. 
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I.  The Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on Brazil 
We begin our analysis by illustrating how the Brazilian financial system was affected by 
the global financial crisis
2. The global financial crisis reached a turning point in 
September 2008, when Lehman’s bankruptcy induced losses to several counterparties 
and forced markets to reassess risks that were previously overlooked. Investors 
withdrew from the markets and liquidity dried up , affecting the real economy. Allen 
and Carletti (2010) argue that the most disruptive consequence of Lehman’s bankruptcy 
was the signal it sent to the international markets that credit risk in the banking sector 
and financial industry was a serious concern. Most banks around the world lost 
substantial equity value and governments had to infuse capital to prevent failure 
(Beltratti and Stulz, 2009). 
In October 2008, the US and European Governments strengthened deposit guarantee 
schemes to avoid bank runs. Ireland, Greece, Germany, Denmark, France and others 
offered blanket guarantees (Willman, 2008; Hall, 2008). In the US, Congress raised the 
deposit insurance from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor, per institution, although 
well-informed depositors know they can have full coverage by putting their money in 
one institution under separately titled accounts. The UK raised deposit protection from 
£35,000 to £50,000 (Cumbo, 2008), which was not enough to stop a flight to safety by 
bank depositors. National Savings & Investments, a state-owned bank that offers 100 
per cent government guarantee received record deposit inflows in the last quarter of 
2008. (Warwick-Ching, 2009). HSBC, which was perceived as safe, had also record 
inflows into its UK deposit accounts (Ross, 2008). 
The turbulence in the US and Europe in the last quarter of 2008 affected the distribution 
of deposits across banks in Brazil, although none of the domestic banks (large or small) 
had exposure to US securitizations of subprime loans. The largest banks experienced a 
significant inflow of deposits from the smaller banks. Figure 1 provides a snapshot of 
the flow of funds from the smaller banks into the largest banks of Brazil (big banks) by 
showing daily data of the market share of certificates of deposit (CDs). From mid-
September to December 2008 the big bank’s market share of certificates of deposit 
spiked almost 7 percentage points, reaching 82.5%. It remained in that level until mid-
March 2009, when it began to go back to pre-crisis market share.  
                                                            
2 An overview of the events of the crisis can be seen in Brunnermeier (2009) and Taylor (2009). 
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[Insert Figure 1 here] 
In an attempt to provide liquidity to the smaller banks, the Brazilian Government took 
several measures, such as the reduction of reserve requirements and the design of a new 
certificate of deposit with a special guarantee of BRL 20,000,000 (equivalent to around 
nine million US dollars at the time) in March 2009
3. 
Another way to see the run from smaller banks to the big banks is by looking at the 
market share of the big banks of insured and uninsured deposits. Figure 2 presents 
semiannual information on the share of total, uninsured and insured deposits of the set 
of big banks. The results are in line with those presented in Figure 1. There was a 
significant rise of 5 percentage points in the otherwise relatively stable share of total 
deposits of the big banks, during the exacerbation of the crisis. Most of this rise is due 
to a spike of 15 percentage points in the market share of uninsured deposits. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
The exacerbation of the global financial crisis in late 2008 also affected the real 
economy of Brazil through basically two major channels: (i) an increase in risk aversion 
tightened external financing conditions and (ii) a significant decline in international 
investment, followed by lower demand for regional exports and a drop in commodity 
prices (IMF, 2009a, b). 
The constraint in external financing led to a significant devaluation of the Brazilian 
currency, the Real, in the last quarter of 2008. Despite the devaluation, there was not a 
process of currency substitution in Brazil: the deposit base grew 24.7% during the third 
and fourth quarter of 2008, as can be seen in Figure 3. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
II.  Testing the Perception of Too Big To Fail 
As mentioned before, the flight to the big banks in Brazil during the most critical stage 
of the global financial crisis is an opportunity to observe depositor reaction to a shock 
that is exogenous to the domestic banking system, since  domestic banks had no 
subprime securitized loans and insignificant exposure to foreign debt. 
                                                            
3 The measures to reduce reserve requirements were taken along the following dates in 2008: September 
24, October 2, 8, 13, 14, 15, 24 and 31, November 13 and 25 and December 19. Measures to change the 
discount window were taken in October 6, 9, 10 and 16. The creation of a new debt instrument with a 
special guarantee of BRL 20,000,000 (equivalent to around nine million dollars at the time) was taken in 
March 26 and 31/2009. 
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There are two important questions to be asked: (1) why was there a reaction of 
depositors in Brazil to the international financial turmoil? and (2) why was the reaction 
a flight from the smaller banks to the big banks? Though the answer to the first question 
is not formally addressed in this paper, we conjecture that the bad news from the global 
banking industry in late 2008 made depositors reassess risks in the banking sector. In 
many aspects, this conjecture is closely related to the models of bank runs presented by 
Chen (1999) and Chen and Hassan (2008). 
There are basically two lines of argument to explain the origins of bank runs. One is 
based on the classical work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) where bank runs are self 
fulfilling prophecies. Given the assumption of first-come, first-served, and costly 
liquidation of some long-term assets, one possible equilibrium is that depositors should 
rationally withdraw their funds if they believe that other depositors will withdraw. 
Another equilibrium occurs when no one believes a banking panic is about to occur, so 
depositors only withdraw their funds according to their liquidity needs. Which of these 
two equilibria occurs depends on random shocks or “sunspots”. 
The second line of argument to explain the origins of banking panics is based on the 
business-cycle. This view asserts that crises are not random events, or the result of 
“sunspots”, but a natural consequence of the business cycle. If depositors receive 
information about an upcoming downturn in the cycle, they try to withdraw their funds 
because they expect a reduction in the value of bank assets and a rise in the probability 
of bank failures. There are several theoretical models consistent with the business cycle 
view, such as Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Gorton 
(1988) and Allen and Gale (1998). Calomiris and Kahn (1991) consider bank runs as a 
result of some depositors gathering information about economic fundamentals that 
would allow assessing the viability of the bank. If the informed depositors conclude that 
a bank is in trouble, they will withdraw their money and precipitate a run. The sudden 
withdrawals will force the bank to liquidate all of its assets. 
The models of Chen (1999) and Chen and Hassan (2008) may be understood as being 
related to both the sunspot view, because of the role of first-come, first-served; and to 
the business cycle view, more particularly to a strand of the business cycle explanation 
that emphasizes the role of information asymmetry in triggering runs. Chen (1999) 
shows that failures of a few banks may serve as a noisy signal to depositors who are not 
able to value their own bank’s assets. These uninformed depositors respond to this 
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negative signal by withdrawing. Since uninformed depositors will withdraw early, the 
informed depositors are compelled to do the same, even though it would be otherwise 
better to wait for more precise bank-specific information. Chen and Hassan (2008) 
extend Chen (1999) to show that expectations about the quality and amount of bank-
specific information that will be revealed can affect depositors’ incentives to withdraw. 
Specifically, panic runs can be triggered not only by bank-specific information, but by 
depositors running when they expect that more noisy information about banks will be 
revealed, or when they expect that precise information about banks will not be revealed. 
In their model, panic runs are more likely to occur when the banking industry is weaker. 
Therefore, we argue that a possible that a possible explanation for the reaction observed 
in Brazil is that the noisy signal originating from the international financial turmoil 
increased the uncertainty and fears about the health of the domestic banking system. 
The second question is the core of our paper: to understand why there was a flight of 
deposits from the smaller banks to the big banks. One possible explanation is that 
depositors thought the largest banks were too big to fail. This is a plausible 
interpretation in face of the international context and also of the recent history of Brazil. 
As mentioned before, Lehman’s demise caused turmoil in the global financial system 
and led to a long list of bailouts with Citibank, Bank of America, AIG, ABN Amro, 
Royal Bank of Scotland, and others. It would be reasonable to think that the Brazilian 
Government would act in accordance to US and Europe and bailout the big banks 
should there be any trouble. Moreover, although Brazil does not have an explicit list of 
too big to fail banks, the country’s recent history implied such policy. After the inflation 
stabilization in 1994, several banks were not able to adjust to the new environment and 
became distressed. In order to address the banking system fragility, the Brazilian 
Government launched three major official bank restructuring programs that included 
government capital injections to the largest private and federally-owned banks of the 
country. Small private and state-owned banks were allowed to fail. The perception of a 
too big to fail policy from depositors may have come from the observation of such 
policy taking place in the US and Europe and from the Brazilian recent history. 
To interpret the run to the largest banks as a result of the perception by depositors of an 
implicit too big to fail policy may be unwarranted, though. An alternative explanation 
could be that those big banks were in a better shape than the smaller ones. In this case, 
the run would be in line with the business-cycle view. 
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There is wide empirical evidence supporting the business-cycle view, such as Calomiris 
and Gorton (1991), Gorton (1988), Mishkin (1991) and Calomiris and Mason (2003). In 
our context, one possible interpretation for deposits flying to the big banks in the midst 
of the crisis would be that depositors were running from banks with worse 
fundamentals. We take into account this alternative explanation by using several control 
variables related to bank fundamentals. The first set of variables includes traditional 
measures of bank risk: equity ratio, the ratio of low quality loans to assets, and the ratio 
of liquid assets to total assets. A second set of variables aims to control for the effects of 
the financial crisis in the Brazilian economy. As mentioned before, the worst period of 
the crisis tightened external financing conditions, so one could argue that bank’s 
dependence of foreign capital to fund its assets became an important risk factor when 
the financial crisis reached its peak. Also, we mentioned that the crisis led to a decline 
in international trade that slowed down the Brazilian economy, so it is plausible that 
depositors could be concerned with particular types of assets that banks held on their 
balance sheets. For instance, loans to middle market firms may be perceived as 
particularly risky if these firms have a higher probability of being financially distressed 
during the economic downturn. We control for the effects of the financial crisis in 
several robustness checks detailed in section IV. 
Finally, to understand why there was a flight of funds from the smaller banks to the big 
banks during the crisis, it is necessary to control for the other features of size that may 
be seen as beneficial to depositors. For instance, larger banks are usually more 
diversified, either by having a large customer base or offering a wide array of financial 
services and products. There may be other features, such as depositors thinking that 
larger banks have more cutting-edge technology and risk management techniques. We 
use the continuous variable log of assets to control for these features.  
One potential limitation of this strategy comes from the possibility that depositors value 
the size discontinuity of the big banks for reasons other than being too big to fail. For 
instance, depositors might think that big banks are safer because they are widely known, 
better managed, less subject to information asymmetries and perhaps more closely 
monitored by the Central Bank. If depositors value the size discontinuity for these other 
subjective reasons, our interpretation of the too big to fail perception would be 
confounded. However, these hypotheses do not seem very plausible for at least three 
reasons. First, the subjective perceptions of safety should be less important for 
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sophisticated institutional investors and our results show that they are precisely the type 
of depositor who ran more heavily to the big banks. Second, several banks went down 
despite official supervision from the Fed, FDIC, FSA, etc. Third, as far as monitoring is 
concerned, Brazilian prudential regulation allows no distinction between the largest 
banks and other banks. 
A.  Identification and Empirical Strategy 
To analyze if the anecdotal observation of deposit concentration in the hands of big 
banks during the crisis is consistent with depositors’ perception of a too big to fail 
policy, we estimate five models with changes in deposits on the left hand size: for 
uninsured deposits, total deposits, certificates of deposits held by institutional investors, 
non-financial firms and individual investors. This allows us to examine potential 
differences in behavior by type of depositors. 
To disentangle the other potential benefits of size other than government protection calls 
for a discontinuity approach, applied by using as one right hand side variable the 
interaction of an indicator of the worst stage of the financial crisis,          and an 
indicator that the bank is part of the set of big banks,           (the selection of these 
banks is further detailed in section II-B), together with appropriate controls. The test for 
the perception of a too big to fail policy during the crisis consists of estimating the 
sensitivity of the change in banks’ deposits to this variable. In other words, the 
perception of a too big to fail policy during the crisis is tested by estimating the 
coefficient   of                  , our main variable of interest. 
The baseline specification is: 
∆         ,         ∆         ,   
   ∆                         ,            ,   
                              ,              ,            
                                                   ,                   





Where     represents the  -th bank’s time invariant unobserved features that might 
influence the change in deposits,    stands for time fixed effects (i.e., the common 
effect of any shock to ∆         in time  ) and   is the error term. 
On the right hand side we have the lagged dependent variable  ∆         , to account 
for possible momentum or mean reversion effects in the dynamics of the change in 
deposits; the change in interest rate premium paid on deposits 
 ∆                         , to account for possible joint determination with 
change in deposits and avoid an omitted variable bias; a vector of bank fundamentals 
traditionally found in the literature       , the growth in retail sales, as a a proxy for 
regional economic activity                             ; the natural logarithm of 
the assets of the bank       , to disentangle the effect of being a big bank from the 
other features continuously related to size, such as brand equity and convenience; an 
indicator of the global financial crisis         ; along with the necessary interactions. 
The model specification also deals with a regulatory change of the amount of insured in 
August, 2006, with a deterministic variable,           . All variables used in this 
study are formally described in the Appendix. 
The variables used in the      vector are: the equity ratio, to evaluate leverage 
              ; the ratio of low quality loans to assets, to evaluate the risk of the loan 
portfolio                    ; and the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, to assess 
liquidity risk            . 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of this baseline specification for uninsured and 
total deposits and Table 12 for institutional investors, non-financial firms and individual 
investors.  
The models are estimated using Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) and the system 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM-Sys) procedure described in Blundell and 
Bond (1998). 
The system GMM allows us to explicitly model the bank unobserved fixed effect 
represented by    and consistently include the lagged dependent variable among the 
regressors, unlike other panel data estimators, such as the traditional Fixed Effects and 
Random Effects procedures. In addition, GMM-Sys enables us to deal with the plausible 
endogenous relationship between bank fundamentals, change in interest rate premium, 
and change in deposits, by using suitable lagged values of the regressors as instrumental 
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variables. A similar procedure permits us to tackle the issue of dynamic endogeneity 
(e.g., see Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2010) caused by the potential influence of shocks 
to the change in deposits over bank fundamentals in future periods (e.g., governance or 
management changes that affect deposits contemporaneously and the bank risk profile 
in subsequent periods). The plausibility of our identifying assumptions (i.e., the 
appropriateness of the set of lagged variables that we choose as instruments) is formally 
tested by the Hansen/Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond 
test for error autocorrelation. In all regressions reported in Table 4 we cannot reject the 
null hypotheses, suggesting that our identifying assumptions are acceptable. Finally, 
with both POLS and GMM-Sys we control for time fixed effects by using time dummy 
variables. 
As mentioned before, we also estimate other seven specifications to take control for 
alternative explanations of the run that are detailed in Section IV - Robustness checks. 
Tables 5 to 11 present the estimation results of these alternative specifications. 
B.  Big Banks 
Systemic risk can be defined as a risk of disruption to financial services caused by a 
deterioration of all or parts of the financial system that potentially brings a negative 
impact on the real economy. Institutions that pose a systemic risk are usually referred to 
as “too big to fail”. The term was first used in a congressional hearing in 1984, right 
after the bailout of Continental Illinois, when the regulator of US national banks 
testified that 11 of the largest banks would receive a similar treatment if necessary 
(Mishkin, 2006). At that time, size of assets was the criterion to characterize 
systemically important financial institutions. 
In our model, the identification of the set of banks that could be perceived as too big to 
fail is based on their importance in the Brazilian market, combining outstanding size, 
substitutability and interconnectedness. Only domestic banks, including those with 
foreign control, were considered as candidates. Our definition of big banks is consistent 
with the concept of systemically important financial institutions. We base our selection 
procedure on several cluster analyses and multidimensional scaling graphs. For these 
formal data analyses we use five variables: (i) total assets plus brokerage, (ii) total 
assets, (iii) total deposits, (iv) number of branches, and (v) number of clients. 
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Table 1 shows the classification suggested by two clustering algorithms, known as K-
means and K-medians (for details, see Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 2005). In both cases 
we specify the number of nonoverlapping groups (k) to be formed through an iterative 
process. In other words, we determine the number of groups to be formed and the 
algorithm chooses how many banks and which banks to assign to each group. 
Specifically, the K-means procedure assigns each bank to the group whose 
(multivariate) mean is closest, whereas the K-medians does the same, but using medians 
instead of means to represent the group centers. The algorithms begin with k randomly 
chosen seed values, which act as the k group means or medians in the first step. Then, 
based on the initial categorization, new group means/medians are computed. This 
procedure is repeated until no observations change groups. Table 1 shows that, when k = 
2, the first cluster is composed by eight banks that are distinctively larger (in terms of 
the five variables we employ) than the remaining banks. The result is the same with 
both algorithms. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
To visualize these clustering patterns we perform a classical multidimensional scaling 
analysis, which is a technique that allows us to represent high-dimensional space 
dissimilarities between observations in a lower-dimensional space. Specifically, we use 
the Euclidean distance between banks in the two-dimensional space to approximate the 
actual distances in the five-dimensional space (since we use five variables). The 
multidimensional scaling configuration graph is shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 reveals that 
the eight banks selected by the cluster analysis are somewhat distinct from other banks, 
taking into consideration the five dimensions of systemic importance defined above. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
III.   Data and Sample Selection 
The Brazilian Financial System has several distinguishing features that have helped 
shape the industrial organization of that country. First, the banking system is regulated 
and supervised exclusively at the federal level. The Central Bank of Brazil and the 
National Monetary Council
4 (CMN, for its acronym in Portuguese) are in charge of 
regulation and the Central Bank is also in charge of authorizations and supervision. 
                                                            




Second, the banking industry is formed mostly of universal banks. It has been like that 
since the end of the 1980s, when there was a regulatory change allowing banks to offer 
different services such as commercial banking, investment banking, consumer financing 
and so on. 
Third, as mentioned before, banks are allowed to open branches anywhere, by discretion 
of the Central Bank of Brazil. That is, there are no rules forbidding interstate or 
international branching, but the Central Bank has to authorize each and every opening. 
Fourth, in certain aspects, regulatory restrictions are more stringent than in developed 
economies. For instance, Brazilian banks are required to have a capital adequacy ratio 
of at least 11%, larger than the 8% Basle requirement. Furthermore, tier II capital may 
not exceed tier I capital. Also, the Central Bank operates a real-time gross settlement 
(RTGS) payment system since April 2002, which avoids the possibility of overdrafts in 
reserves at any time. 
The Brazilian Deposit Insurance Fund, Fundo Garantidor de Crédito (FGC, for its 
acronym in Portuguese) is mandatory, privately-funded and was founded in 1995, in the 
aftermath of the restructuring programs mentioned before. The FGC covers the amount 
held by each person against one financial conglomerate up to BRL 60,000 – around 
USD 30,000. Initially it covered up to BRL 20,000 but the amount of coverage was 
extended in June 2006, during a calm period for the Brazilian banking system. 
Almost all types of deposits in Brazil are in local currency and eligible for deposit 
insurance
5. The distribution of deposits is shown on Panel A of Table 2. Checking 
account deposits, savings deposits and time deposits accounted for around 93% of the 
funds deposited in Brazilian banks during the sample period. The remaining 7% include 
interbank deposits and other deposits, such as those related to litigations. Checking 
account deposits pay no interest and, on average, accounted for 16% of total deposits 
over the sample period. Savings deposits pay an interest rate determined by law: a 
floating interest rate of 6 percentage points over a fraction of a specific inflation index. 
On average, savings deposits accounted for 28% of total deposits. Checking and savings 
                                                            
5 Deposits in foreign currency account for less than 2% of total deposits in Brazil and are allowed only to 
very specific types of investors (non-resident persons and companies). Some other types of deposits are 
not eligible for deposit insurance, such as: i) deposits, loans or any other type of funding raised abroad; ii) 
deposits related to litigations; iii) time deposits authorized to compose Tier-2 of the regulatory capital. 
These ineligible-for-insurance deposits account for less than 10% of the overall amount of deposits in the 
Brazilian Financial system. 
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deposits may be withdrawn on demand by the customer without notice or penalty. Time 
deposits (mostly certificates of deposits) pay interest, and the rate may be fixed or 
floating. Around 70% of the time deposits in Brazil allow early withdrawal (eventually 
with a penalty rate). Throughout the sample period, time deposits accounted for 49% of 
total deposits on average. 
Our primary database consists of semiannual observations of all deposit-taking banks in 
Brazil in the database of the Central Bank of Brazil between December/2001 and 
December/2009 (17 periods). We exclude from our sample banks that do not appear 
among the top 50 in either deposit taking or total assets in any of the 17 periods. We 
also exclude banks that were under Central Bank intervention. We require that the ratio 
of deposits over assets be higher than 1% and that all observations have nonmissing data 
for book assets, while all multivariate analysis implicitly requires nonmissing data for 
the relevant variables. To mitigate the impact of data errors and outliers on our analysis, 
we Winsorize all variables at the 5
th and 95
th percentiles. 
Panel B of Table 2 lays out the representativeness of the sample. We have a total of 74 
banks in the beginning of the sample period, and end up with 53 banks.(the number 
decreases over time due to mergers and acquisitions and only one bank failure occurred 
in 2004). This sample of banks hold from 96.1 to 99.1% of the deposits eligible for 
deposit insurance in the Brazilian Financial System along the studied period. Panel B 
also shows a large increase in the amount of deposits holdings by Brazilian banks: in 
less than 8 years, the amount of deposits has increased fourfold in Brazil. During the 
same period, the cumulative inflation rate was almost 70%. This rise can be attributed to 
a series of factors, such as nominal GDP growth of 141% in the sample period, the 
sharp increase in credit operations, the inclusion of the lower classes of the population 
into the banking system and the maintenance of high interest rates by the Central Bank 
in the period. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The data we use in this study has three sources. The first set of data is available to the 
public, provided by the Central Bank of Brazil. It comprises detailed balance sheet, 
income and earnings reports, as well as data on the number and location of branches, 




The second source for our data is private, and comes from the Brazilian Deposit 
Insurance Fund, (Fundo Garantidor de Crédito – FGC). This is a unique bank level data 
on the number of depositors and volume of deposits in several different deposit-size 
brackets for all Brazilian banking firms. This novel data allow us to compute the 
volume of insured and uninsured deposits of each bank in each period
6. 
Third, we use private data provided by the Central Bank of Brazil that comprises daily 
balances of certificates of deposits in the hands of institutional investors, non-financial 
firms and individual investors; and semiannual information on the different types of 
bank loans outstanding. 
Fourth, we also use data from the retail sales index provided the Brazilian Institute for 
Geography and Statistics (IBGE, for its acronym in Portuguese), which provides the 
growth in retail sales for each state of the federation
7 as well as the resulting national 
growth in retail sales. This is the most used indicator of regional economic activity in 
Brazil. 
We treat merged banks (or acquisitions in which two different banks start consolidating 
their balance sheets) as new banking entities. For example, if Bank A acquires Bank B 
(or even if Bank A and Bank B merge into bank AB), we treat the merged bank as a 
new bank, Bank C. There were two mergers among the largest banks in Brazil during 
the exacerbation of the global financial crisis, in the end of 2008. In this case, the 
change in deposits was calculated based on the sum of deposits of the two merging 
banks. 
A.  Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 3 for dates Dec/2001, Jun/2008 and Dec/2009. 
We split the statistics into big banks and other banks. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Overall, banks have notably increased asset size and equity during the sample period. 
The other banks rely more on uninsured deposits than the big banks, which is explained 
by the fact that big banks have more branches and hold deposits of small retail clients, 
while the other banks rely mostly on middle market, corporate and institutional 
                                                            
6 The periods range from January 1
st to June 30
th and July 1
st to December 31
st. 
7 Brazil has 27 states. 
18 
 
depositors. In addition, big banks have a slightly higher ratio of low quality loans to 
assets and lower equity ratio on average. In the beginning of the sample period, big 
banks had slightly higher liquidity than the other banks. In the period immediately 
before the crisis, we note that both sets of banks had experienced a decrease in liquidity, 
especially big banks, which ended up less liquid than the other banks. The same pattern 
remains in the last sample period. The most striking difference between big banks and 
the other banks is deposit concentration (the portion of a bank’s asset being funded by 
each depositor on average). The ratio of deposit concentration of other banks to big 
banks is over 9,800 in December/2009. 
IV.  Results 
Our main parameter of interest is the coefficient ( ) of the interaction of the global 
financial crisis dummy  with our big bank dummy (                 . It captures the 
expected difference in the percent change in bank deposits between big banks and other 
banks during the most critical stage of the financial crisis, controlling for fundamentals, 
change in interest rate paid on deposits, size of assets and macro effects. In other words, 
a positive and significant   in the uninsured deposits regression indicates that 
depositors behave consistently with the perception of a too big to fail policy. In contrast, 
we expect a lower   in the total deposits regression. 
The results of the estimations of the models of uninsured and total deposits, using 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) and the System Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM-Sys) are shown in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
We find a positive and statistically significant   for the deposits regressions under both 
estimation procedures (in all cases, at the 1% level). These estimates are also 
economically large, corresponding to a predicted increase of approximately 45 
percentage points in uninsured deposits for the big banks group in comparison with 
other banks during the critical stage of the crisis. In addition, as expected, we find a 
positive but much lower   for total deposits regression under all estimation procedures 
(predicting approximately 36 percentage point additional increase in deposits for big 
banks during the crisis). 
The coefficient of the          dummy is not statistically significant, at conventional 
levels, in any regression. This means that, during normal times, the percentage change 
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of both uninsured and total deposits is unrelated to whether the bank is in our big bank 
group or not. Thus, our evidence suggests that investors might perceive a too big to fail 
policy and that such perception is relevant only in times of crisis. 
The coefficient of      is nonsignificant in the uninsured and total deposits models, no 
matter the estimation procedure. All of the other controls shown in Table 4 (equity ratio, 
low quality loans and liquidity) and their interactions with the crisis dummy have non-
significant coefficient estimates. These widely used proxies for bank fundamentals are 
not relevant for explaining the behavior of depositors neither in normal times nor during 
the financial crisis. The results shown in Table 4 also show that interest rates paid on 
deposits have little or no power to explain the change in deposits, which is consistent 
with the idea that money markets are risk intolerant. The fact that traditional control 
variables have little explanatory power is intriguing, because it suggests that depositors 
are not sensitive to bank fundamentals both in normal times and during the crisis. Since 
previous empirical research has found evidence supporting runs based on fundamentals, 
we believe it is very likely that one or more important risk factors related to the 
characteristics of the crisis may be missing in this specification. We shed some light on 
the subject in section IV.C below. 
Overall, the estimates shown in Table 4 suggest that the positive spike in deposits of big 
banks during the financial crisis cannot be explained by the heterogeneity in bank 
fundamentals, by a simple size effect or by a general propensity of such banks to attract 
more deposits than their competitors. 
V.  Robustness Checks 
A - Isolating the impacts of the Global Financial Crisis on the Brazilian Financial 
System 
A.1. – Types of loans 
During the most critical stage of the global financial crisis, the set of big banks may 
have been considered safer not necessarily because they would be bailed out, but 
because depositors believe those big banks would be more resilient to the crisis effects. 
We take a deeper look at bank loans, since it is plausible that depositors could be 
concerned with particular types of assets that banks were exposed to on their balance 
sheets. We are especially interested in banks that engage in trade finance loans and 
middle market operations (loans made to small and medium-sized firms). Trade finance 
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loans are very collateralized by import/export contracts, have typically very low 
delinquency rate and loss given default, and are thus expected to be safe during the 
crisis. On the other hand, middle market loans have typically low collateral and are held 
to maturity by the lender bank (instead of being securitized and traded in the secondary 
market) and thus we could expect depositors to percept these loans to be riskier during 
the financial crisis, since small and medium firms have a higher probability of being 
financially distressed during the economic downturn. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The results shown in Table 5 show that, although the signs of the coefficients estimates 
for the interactions of these types of asset exposure with the crisis dummy (trade 
finance x crisis and middle market x crisis) are consistent with the above rationale, they 
are not statistically significant at the usual levels. The other coefficient estimates of 
interest (especially big bank x crisis) are practically unchanged by the inclusion of these 
variables. 
A.2 – Liquidity freeze 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
As mentioned before, one of the effects of the financial turmoil was tight external 
financing conditions. After Lehman’s bankruptcy the interbank market virtually froze, 
so banks that depended more heavily on external financing would probably suffer the 
most and could become distressed. We use the ratio of foreign funds to total assets as a 
proxy for bank’s dependence on external financing on the right hand side of our model. 
However, we find no evidence that depositors favored banks with lower dependence on 
foreign funding, as we show on Table 6. 
A.3 – Deposit concentration and reliance on institutional depositors 
Another indirect measure of exposure on the liabilities side is depositor concentration, 
measured as the fraction of assets being funded by each depositor on average. Banks 
that have a narrower depositor base, where few depositors hold a large share of the total 
deposits, may be in impending distress. For instance, if some of these depositors had to 
withdraw their funds at the same time due to liquidity reasons related to the global 
financial crisis, the bank might lose a significant share of its funding. This would be 
exacerbated under the Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) model, that states that when noisy 
information is revealed, depositors would tend to run because the bank could be in 
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trouble if only a few depositors decide to run first. Therefore, in order to control for this 
feature, we use the natural logarithm of the ratio of the average deposit size to total 
assets as a right hand side variable that accounts for deposit concentration. We use logs 
to mitigate the extreme right-tail asymmetry of this variable. Results shown in Table 7 
indicate that there is no evidence that depositor concentration affects the growth in 
deposits. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Under the rationale above, the first-come, first-serve issue is even more exacerbated if 
depositors assume one (or both) of the two hypotheses: i) that other depositors have 
superior information; ii) that other depositors are extremely risk-averse and thus will run 
when noisy information is expected. Institutional investors (such as pension and mutual 
funds) are the typical case of well informed and, in some cases, risk-averse depositors. 
As mentioned before, Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2010) find evidence that the behavior 
of institutional investors depends on whether they are surrounded by other institutional 
investors or by retail investors in mutual funds. To account for this factor, we use a 
measure of reliance on institutional investors for funding, which is the ratio between the 
amount of certificates of deposit held by institutional investors and total assets. Table 8 
shows that, during normal times, the reliance on institutional investors is not important 
for driving deposits’ growth, while there is a very significant (economic and statistical) 
negative effect of relying on deposits of institutional investors during the financial crisis 
for both uninsured and total deposits, which is consistent with Chen, Goldstein and 
Jiang (2010) empirical findings. During the financial crisis, a 1 percentage point 
increase in the reliance on institutional investors would decrease deposits by over 2.8 
percentage points, for both uninsured and total deposits. In addition, when reliance on 
institutional investors is considered in our regressions, the coefficient of the interaction 
of liquidity and crisis turns out to show a positive and significant (at the 10% level) 
effect on deposits. The inclusion of these additional controls slightly changes the 
magnitude and standard errors of some coefficients but it does not significantly alter our 
inferences. In particular, the estimates for the big bank x crisis interaction lowers to the 
38-48 percentage points range for uninsured deposits and 29-38 percentage points range 
for total deposits. The results in Table 8, however, could simply mean that institutional 
investors were the ones who ran from deposits, so that the higher the concentration of 
deposits held by institutional investors in a certain bank, the more it lost deposits (or the 
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less it gained deposits). We show that this was not the case, when we return to this issue 
in section C below. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
B – Government-owned banks 
We then investigate if depositors favor government-owned banks against privately-held 
banks. 10 banks in our sample are controlled by the government (4 by the Federal 
Government and 6 by states of the federation), 2 of which are included in our list of big 
banks. It is plausible to assume that deposits perceive government-owned banks as 
enjoying some kind of implicit guarantee to depositors, so that these banks could be 
considered too-protected-to-fail. To account for this possibility, we include a dummy 
variable for non-big banks government-owned banks (i.e. banks that are controlled by 
the government and do not belong to our list of big banks) and also interact it with the 
financial crisis dummy. The results shown in Table 9 indicate that these banks do not 
enjoy higher deposit growth during normal times. The coefficient of the interaction 
variable (government-owned bank x crisis) shows some evidence, although weak, that 
the increase in both uninsured and total deposits during the financial crisis was higher 
for government-owned banks. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
To further investigate the issue of an implicit protection to government-owned banks, 
we investigate whether the big bank x crisis effect was larger for the 2 government-
owned banks of our big bank group than for privately-owned banks in the group. We do 
that by first excluding big private banks from the sample (results in Table 10) and then 
excluding big government-owned banks (results in Table 11). The results of Table 10 
and 11 show that there is virtually no difference in our estimates of the big bank x crisis 
coefficient for uninsured deposits between private and government-owned banks (either 
of them enjoy circa 45 percentage points more growth in uninsured deposits compared 
to the other banks). When we turn our attention to total deposits, the results also show 
little difference: we observe a coefficient of 34 percentage points for government-
owned banks and 38 percentage points for private banks. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
23 
 
C - The behavior of different types of depositors 
We then investigate the behavior of different types of depositors. Certificates of 
deposits may be held by each of the three classes of investors: 1) institutional; 2) non-
financial firms and; 3) individuals. It would be reasonable to conjecture that the first are 
the ones with superior information and higher degree of sophistication among the 3 
classes, while individuals would be less informed and less sophisticated. We then run 
our baseline specification for each of the different classes of investors.  
The results of Table 12 show that, during normal times, institutional investors are 
sensitive to banks’ equity ratio. Our estimates imply that a 1 percentage point increase 
in the equity ratio predicts an increase in the growth rate of certificates of deposit held 
by institutional investors of around 1.1 percentage points. Institutional investors are 
sensitive to banks’ exposure to trade finance during normal times and during the crisis. 
In normal times, a greater exposure is mildly penalized by institutional investors: a 1 
percentage point increase in exposure predicts a fall in the growth rate of deposits of 
0.11 percentage point. However, during the financial crises, the same increase of 1 
percentage point in exposure predicts a rise in the growth rate of deposits of 0.74 
percentage points. One possible explanation is that, in normal times, a higher 
diversification of the loan portfolio is preferred, but during the crisis, banks that have 
higher concentration on the safer types of loans are better off. 
Regarding our main variable of interest, we find very large coefficients for institutional 
investors although with different degrees of statistical significance, depending on the 
model specification (2 at the 5% level, 1 at the 1% level and 1 at the 10% level). For 
non-financial firms coefficients are always significant at the 1% level, but smaller in 
magnitude. In columns (4) and (8), when we control for the presence of other 
institutional investors, the magnitude of the coefficients of the big bank x crisis 
substantially lowers for both types of investors. These findings suggest that some part of 
the run could be explained by incentives to withdraw depending on whether depositors 
fear others will withdraw first. The estimates shown in columns (9) to (12) suggest that 
individual investors did not favor big banks during the crisis. 
D. The  post-crisis  period 
The previous tests have shown that depositors favored big banks, banks that relied less 
on the funding of institutional investors during the crisis and that these results were 
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driven by the behavior of both institutional investors and non-financial corporations. We 
now investigate how deposit growth evolved for different banks in the post-crisis 
period, which we define as the first and second semesters of 2009 (Jun-09 and Dec-09). 
Both the OLS and the GMM regressions reported on table 13 show that the change in 
uninsured deposits during the post-crisis period (big bank x post crisis) for other banks 
was 15 percentage points larger compared to big banks (13% for total deposits), with 
10% statistical significance. It is important to note that the coefficient obtained for the 
post crisis period (by itself, not interacted with big bank) is not significantly different 
from zero at the usual levels. In addition, the coefficients of reliance on institutional 
investors x post crisis show that banks that had a larger share of their assets funded by 
CDs of institutional investors experienced larger deposit growth (for both uninsured and 
total deposits, under OLS and GMM specifications) in the post crisis period.  
[Insert Table 13 here] 
These results reveal important information on the behavior of depositors. Indeed, there 
is evidence that the run identified in other banks during the critical stage of the financial 
crisis is partially reverted for uninsured deposits and almost entirely reverted for total 
deposits in the post crisis period (note that there are 2 periods considered post crisis). 
This evidence is in some sense consistent with the hypotheses that relate bank runs to 
noisy information that is revealed (or expected) during crises and the too big to fail 
hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 14 here] 
We also look at how different types of depositors (institutional investors, non financial 
companies and individuals) behaved after the crisis. The results in Table 14 show that 
the coefficients for big bank x post crisis are negative and statistically and economically 
significant for institutional investors under all specifications, whilst the coefficients of 
the other variables of interest (including big bank x crisis) remain practically 
unchanged. In fact, the positive change in deposits of institutional investors observed for 
big banks during the crisis is more than reverted after the crisis
8. For non financial firms 
and individuals, we also observe negative coefficients for big bank x post crisis, but in 
only one case it is statistically significant at the 10% level. These results clearly indicate 
                                                            
8 Again note that our definition of post crisis includes 2 semesters, and the coefficients of big bank x.post 
crisis is more than half the coefficient of big bank x crisis. 
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that institutional investors performed a “flight-to-big-banks” movement during the crisis 
(and only during the crisis).  
This reversal in the change in deposits to other banks observed in the post crisis period 
can also be attributed, at least in part, to the creation of a special CD with guarantee of 
up to BRL20 million (around USD 9 million) in March 2009 as mentioned before. In 
fact, there is anecdotal evidence reporting that institutional investors account for a great 
portion of this special guaranteed CD. 
E. Additional controls for bank fundamentals 
We implement several other robustness tests to check the stability of our main results. 
Our baseline specification uses bank fundamentals in level, in accordance to the market 
discipline literature. However, it is possible that depositors are indeed interested in 
trends of bank fundamentals. Thus, we substitute ∆  ,    for   ,    in equation (1), 
meaning that we now control for the change in bank fundamentals (i.e., capital 
adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings, and liquidity) from   2  to 
  1 . This alternative specification addresses the possibility that clients are mainly 
sensitive to improvements or deteriorations of bank fundamentals instead of their level 
when deciding to withdraw or expand their deposits. In these regressions (results not 
reported), the coefficients estimated for ∆  turn out to be nonsignificant in all cases. 
However, our coefficient of interest (  in equation (1)) again remains practically 
unchanged. 
F. Alternative estimators and identifying assumptions 
We also check our results employing alternative estimators and/or identifying 
assumptions. First, we use the GMM fixed effects panel data estimator proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) with identifying assumptions regarding the endogeneity of 
some regressors similar to those used in the GMM regressions reported in Table 4, 
namely, allowing the bank fundamentals contained in vector  , plus ∆        , 
Δ              , and      to be only sequentially exogenous (i.e., potentially 
correlated with the error term   in some time periods). Specifically, by using suitable 
lagged values as instruments, we let bank fundamentals and size to be correlated with 
past shocks, thus allowing for feedback effects running from the change in deposits to 
those variables. Similarly, we let ∆         and Δ               to be correlated 
with past as well as contemporaneous values of  , thus accounting for the likely 
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simultaneous determination of the volume and price of deposits. We also rerun all 
regressions using the two-step GMM estimator instead of the one-step procedure 
reported in Table 4. Finally, we employ alternative identifying assumptions, such as 
allowing the bank fundamentals to be correlated with   contemporaneously, as well. For 
the benefit of space, we do not report the results of these exercises. In all cases, our 
main inferences are not materially affected, though. 
VI.  Concluding remarks 
When a too big to fail policy is in place, either formally or implicitly, there are fewer 
incentives for debt holders and depositors to discipline financial institutions, leading to 
an increase in moral hazard. 
This study shows that the perception of an implicit too big to fail policy affects 
depositor behavior. Specifically, we analyze the reaction of Brazilian depositors to the 
international financial turmoil triggered by Lehman Brother’s demise in September 
2008. Taken together, our results indicate that depositors moved their funds to the 
largest banks of the country because depositors thought those banks would not be 
allowed to fail. The effect for uninsured deposits was larger than for total deposits. 
Likewise, the effect for certificates of deposits held by institutional investors was larger 
than for those held by non-financial firms. We find that depositors’ response to bank 
fundamentals was relatively weak, which seem to support the view that a run may occur 
when depositors learn information from other banking systems, which serves as a noisy 
signal on domestic bank-specific information. Depositors feared for their funds and 
decided to run to where they believed was safe: the largest banks of the country, 
implicitly protected by the Federal Government and the Central Bank. This result is in 
line with some features of the bank runs model of Chen (1999) and Chen and Hassan 
(2008). 
We also find that the presence of institutional investors seems to have played a role in 
the run in Brazil. Banks that depended on institutional investors for funding suffered 
more deposit outflows, not only from institutional investors themselves, but also from 
non-financial firms. This result indicates that some part of the run can be explained by 
incentives to withdraw depending on whether depositors fear others will withdraw first, 
which is in line with the evidence from mutual funds outflow found in Chen, Goldstein 




Taken together, our results indicate that, in the face of uncertainty, depositors 
considered the largest banks too big to fail and behaved consistently. This calls our 
attention to possible cross-border spillover effects caused by public policies in 
developed markets and to the need for improved market discipline. It also makes a 
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Figure 1. Market Share of Certificates of Deposits (CDs) 
 
The purple solid line shows the daily evolution of the market share of CDs of the big banks. The 
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Figure 3. Total Deposits and Real Effective Exchange Rate Index 
 
The blue line shows the evolution of total deposits (in billions of BRL – left 
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Figure 4. Multidimensional Scaling Configuration Graph 
 
The graph below represents the Euclidian distances between banks in two-dimensional space as an 
approximation of the original distances computed for the following five variables (in standardized form): 










Table 1 – Big banks – Results from the cluster analysis 
The groups shown in this table were suggested by the cluster analysis algorithms K-means and K-
medians, setting the number of clusters to k = 2. Five variables were used for clustering: (i) total assets 
plus brokerage, (ii) total assets, (iii) total deposits, (iv) number of branches, and (v) number of clients. 
The algorithms search iteratively for the best partition using the squared Euclidean distance as the 
dissimilarity measure. We use only pre-crisis data, from December/2001 through June/2008. 
 
Cluster Bank 
Cluster 1 (Big Banks) 
ABN AMRO    BB    Bradesco    CEF    HSBC    Itau    Santander    
Unibanco 
Cluster 2 (Other Banks) 
ABC-Brasil    Alfa    Bancoob    Banese    Banestes    Banif    Banpara    
Banrisul    Bansicredi    Basa    BBM    Besc    BGN    BIC    BMG    
BNB    BNP Paribas    Bonsucesso    Brascan    BRB    BTMUB    BVA    
Citibank    Credit Suisse    Cruzeiro do Sul    Daycoval    DBB BM    
Deutsche    Fibra     Ibibank    Industrial do Brasil    Indusval    ING    J. 
Malucelli    John Deere    JP Morgan Chase    Mercantil do Brasil    
Nossa Caixa    SS    Pine    Prosper    Rabobank    Rural    Safra    
Schahin    SMBC    Societe Generale    Sofisa    UBS Pactual    




Table 2 – Sample 
 
Panel A – Distribution of deposits in the sample 
Rows [A] to [E] show the proportion of each type of deposit in relation to total deposits in financial 
institutions of our sample as of December of each year from 2001 to 2009. 
 


















[A] Checking account 
deposits   16% 18% 16% 16% 15% 16% 20% 14% 14% 
[B]  Savings  deposits    34% 32% 31% 30% 26% 26% 27% 23% 26% 
[C]  Time  Deposits    45% 46% 46% 48% 51% 50% 46% 56% 55% 
[D]  Interbank  Deposits  2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 3% 
[E]  Other  Deposits  3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 4% 2% 
[F] Total Deposits ([A] + 
[B] + [C] + [D] +[E]) 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Panel B – Representativeness of sample  
Row [A] shows the number of deposit-taking financial institutions as of December of each year from 
2001 to 2009, while row [B] shows the number of banks considered in our sample in the same period. In 
row C, we show the total amount of deposits eligible to receive deposit insurance in the Brazilian 
Financial System, while in row [D] we show the amount of deposits eligible for deposit insurance for the 
banks in our sample. In row [E], it is shown the proportion of deposits considered in this study relative to 
the overall deposits of the Brazilian Financial System. 
 


















[A] Number of deposit-
taking financial 
institutions  
121 111 110 108 104 104 101 101 100 
[B] Number of banks in 
the sample   74 71 68 65 64 61 60 57 53 
[C] Total Deposits 
(billions of BRL)   313 365 400 470 546 624 740  1,003  1,252 
[D] Total Deposits of 
sample (billions of BRL)  304 357 395 465 535 600 712 986  1,240 
[E] Representativeness of 




Table 3 – Summary statistics 
Means and standard deviations (in brackets) are reported for Dec/2001, Jun/2008 and Dec/2009. Big 
banks are defined as in Section II-B. 
 
Dec/2001 Jun/2008 Dec/2009 
Big banks  Other banks  Big banks  Other banks  Big banks  Other banks 
Total assets (BRL Millions) 
75,488  4,557  271,531 10,985 416,329 11,569 
[45,794]  [6,581]  [132,459] [15,254] [208,678] [16,730] 
Total equity (BRL Millions) 
6,335  431  21,606 1.158 35,819 1,270 
[3,024]  [537]  [12,659] [1.304] [22,210] [1,468] 
# of depositors (thousands) 
10,048 192 16,282 245 23,939 138 
[7,279] [648] [9,989] [770]  [12,094]  [336] 
Uninsured deposits / total 
deposits 
58.6%  87.8% 62.98% 87.0%  61.8%  80.4% 
[13.8%] [17.3%] [15.5%] [19.7%] [14.1%] [21.2%] 
Equity ratio 
9.7%  14.6% 8.54%  14.56% 9.8%  15.0% 
[4.3%] [8.3%]  [1.97%]  [8.1%] [5.6%] [7.9%] 
Low quality loans 
2.6% 2.5% 2.3% 1.9% 3.2% 2.3% 
[0.7%] [3.7%] [0.3%] [3.5%] [0.5%] [2.1%] 
Liquidity 
34.5% 32.5% 19.2% 27.0% 19.8% 27.8% 
[9.5%] [19.2%] [9.2%] [16.4%] [8.1%] [18.3%] 
Exposure to trade finance 
- -  10.4%  11.0%  8.1%  12.4% 
    [4.7%] [17.0%] [4.5%] [16.0%] 
Exposure to middle market 
-  -  34.8% 34.9% 43.9% 42.6% 
    [4.7%] [27.4%] [4.9%] [27.5%] 
Foreign funding 
10.71%  11.79%  4.4% 9.0% 2.5% 8.5% 
[6.1%] [13.7%] [2.1%] [10.3%] [1.8%]  [8.5%] 
Reliance on institutional 
investors 
0.9% 4.7% 3.6% 6.7% 1.6% 8.0% 
[0.9%] [6.0%] [3.6%] [9.0%] [1.6%]  [10.7%] 
Deposit concentration 
(x1000) 
0.00007 1.60 0.00005 0.49 0.00004 0.98 
[0.00005] [8.10] [0.00006] [1.35] [0.00006] [3.65] 
Observations  8 66 8 51 6 46 





Table 4 – Change in deposits, financial crisis and big banks 
This table shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) for the change in uninsuredand total deposits 
using the pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and (one-step) system GMM estimators. In the GMM 
regressions, we allow all variables to be only sequentially exogenous, employing suitable lagged values as 
their instruments, except for the following regressors, which are assumed to be strictly exogenous: time 
dummies; Regional economic activity; Big Bank dummy; and Big Bank x Crisis. Coefficient estimates and 
autocorrelation/heteroskedasticity-robust t-tests are shown in parentheses. Estimates for the time dummies 
and MechChange (see Appendix) are omitted. D stands for first difference and L stands for first lag. 
Variables interacted with the crisis dummy are lagged according to the variable that appears without 
interaction (for example, equity ratio x crisis is the interaction of the crisis dummy with the first lag of the 
equity ratio, since equity ratio, by itself, is also in first lag).  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
    Uninsured  Deposits Total  Deposits 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    OLS GMM-Sys OLS GMM-Sys 
Variables of interest        
Crisis dummy    -0.265  -0.266    -0.216 
   (-1.545)  (-1.549)    (-1.254) 
Size   0.000  0.000  -0.003  -0.003 
   (0.041)  (0.042)  (-0.363)  (-0.361) 
Big  bank  dummy    -0.011 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 
   (-0.337) (-0.325) (-0.399) (-0.384) 
Big bank x crisis    0.448***  0.447***  0.358***  0.358*** 
    (3.671) (3.648) (3.492) (3.465) 
Control Variables        
Change in uninsured deposits  L  0.038  0.037     
   (0.663)  (0.632)     
Change in total deposits  L      0.048  0.047 
       (0.858)  (0.821) 
Premium  paid  on  deposits  D  -0.787 -1.100 -0.817 -1.181 
   (-0.542) (-0.784) (-0.570) (-0.847) 
Equity  ratio  L  0.320 0.320 0.284 0.285 
    (1.620) (1.621) (1.463) (1.462) 
Low quality loans  L  0.099 0.094 -0.236  -0.242 
   (0.173)  (0.164)  (-0.423)  (-0.436) 
Liquidity L  0.011  0.011  -0.003  -0.003 
   (0.174)  (0.168)  (-0.042)  (-0.050) 
Regional  economic  activity    0.246 0.253 0.050 0.059 
    (0.755) (0.757) (0.186) (0.211) 
Equity ratio x crisis    -0.675  -0.675  -0.950  -0.950 
   (-1.016) (-1.019) (-1.457) (-1.462) 
Low quality loans x crisis    -1.702  -1.694  -1.818  -1.809 
   (-0.453) (-0.452) (-0.497) (-0.496) 
Liquidity  x  crisis    0.394 0.391 0.381 0.378 
    (1.031) (1.025) (1.010) (1.003) 
Constant    0.040 0.041 0.154 0.155 
    (0.221) (0.226) (0.908) (0.914) 
        
Observations    858 858 858 858 
R-squared    0.102  0.085  
F    4.702 4.731 3.494 3.474 
F_p   . 5.68e-08 . 1.42e-05 
hansen    . 56.63 . 47.00 
hansenp    . 1 . 1 
# of cross sections      75    75 
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Table 5 – Exposure to trade finance and middle market loans 
This table shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) for the change in uninsured and total 
deposits using the pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and (one-step) system GMM estimators. In the 
GMM regressions, we allow all variables to be only sequentially exogenous, employing suitable lagged 
values as their instruments, except for the following regressors, which are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous: time dummies; Regional economic activity; Big Bank dummy; and Big Bank x Crisis. 
Coefficient estimates and autocorrelation/heteroskedasticity-robust t-tests are shown in parentheses. 
Estimates for the time dummies and MechChange (see Appendix) are omitted. D stands for first 
difference and L stands for first lag. Variables interacted with the crisis dummy are lagged according to 
the variable that appears without interaction (for example, equity ratio x crisis is the interaction of the 
crisis dummy with the first lag of the equity ratio, since equity ratio, by itself, is also in first lag).  *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
    Uninsured  Deposits Total  Deposits 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    OLS GMM-Sys OLS GMM-Sys 
Variables of interest        
Crisis dummy   -0.204  -0.377**  -0.132 -0.296* 
    (-1.176) (-2.137) (-0.772) (-1.670) 
Size   0.001  0.001  -0.002  -0.002 
   (0.110)  (0.110)  (-0.183)  (-0.183) 
Big bank dummy    -0.007  -0.007  -0.011  -0.011 
    (-0.199) (-0.190) (-0.328) (-0.317) 
Big bank x crisis    0.482***  0.482***  0.381***  0.381*** 
   (3.680) (3.654) (3.430) (3.400) 
Control variables        
Exposure to trade finance  L  -0.026  -0.026  -0.038  -0.037 
    (-0.966) (-0.955) (-1.427) (-1.415) 
Exposure to middle market  L  0.033  0.033  0.023  0.022 
   (0.956) (0.953) (0.670) (0.664) 
Trade finance x crisis    0.158  0.157  0.132  0.131 
   (1.316) (1.316) (1.101) (1.098) 
Middle market x crisis    -0.145  -0.145  -0.167  -0.167 
    (-1.334) (-1.339) (-1.556) (-1.562) 
Change in uninsured deposits  L  0.039  0.039     
   (0.671)  (0.668)     
Change in total deposits  L      0.048  0.049 
       (0.860)  (0.855) 
Premium paid on deposits  D  -0.732  -1.110  -0.764  -1.219 
    (-0.506) (-0.768) (-0.537) (-0.853) 
Equity  ratio  L  0.295 0.294 0.265 0.264 
   (1.538) (1.531) (1.424) (1.415) 
Low quality loans  L  -0.018  -0.018  -0.392  -0.392 
    (-0.032) (-0.032) (-0.708) (-0.710) 
Liquidity L  0.001  0.000  -0.015  -0.016 
   (0.020)  (0.007)  (-0.231)  (-0.247) 
Regional economic activity    0.200  0.202  0.028  0.028 
   (0.615) (0.609) (0.102) (0.100) 
Equity ratio x crisis    -0.296  -0.295  -0.591  -0.590 
    (-0.427) (-0.427) (-0.864) (-0.865) 
Low quality loans x crisis    -0.808  -0.816  -1.390  -1.400 
    (-0.218) (-0.221) (-0.380) (-0.383) 
Liquidity x crisis    0.546  0.544  0.503  0.501 
   (1.462) (1.459) (1.345) (1.342) 
Constant    -0.133 0.041 -0.015 0.150 
   (-0.751) (0.215) (-0.089) (0.824) 
Observations    858 858 858 858 
R-squared    0.108  0.091  
F    4.723 4.700 3.216 3.203 
F-p    . 2.53e-08 . 2.54e-05 
Hansen    . 44.27 . 42.62 
Hansen-p    . 1 . 1 
# of cross sections      75    75 
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Table 6 – Exposure to foreign funding 
This table shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) for the change in uninsured and total 
deposits using the pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and (one-step) system GMM estimators. In the 
GMM regressions, we allow all variables to be only sequentially exogenous, employing suitable lagged 
values as their instruments, except for the following regressors, which are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous: time dummies; Regional economic activity; Big Bank dummy; and Big Bank x Crisis. 
Coefficient estimates and autocorrelation/heteroskedasticity-robust t-tests are shown in parentheses. 
Estimates for the time dummies and mechanical change in deposits (see Appendix) are omitted. D stands 
for first difference and L stands for first lag. Variables interacted with the crisis dummy are lagged 
according to the variable that appears without interaction (for example, equity ratio x crisis is the 
interaction of the crisis dummy with the first lag of the equity ratio, since equity ratio, by itself, is also in 
first lag).  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
    Uninsured  Deposits Total  Deposits 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    OLS GMM-Sys OLS GMM-Sys 
Variables of interest        
Crisis dummy    -0.328*  -0.329*    -0.309* 
   (-1.982)  (-1.991)    (-1.949) 
Size   0.000  0.000  -0.003  -0.004 
   (0.034)  (0.037)  (-0.355)  (-0.388) 
Big bank dummy    -0.013  -0.013  -0.014  -0.013 
    (-0.383) (-0.380) (-0.428) (-0.402) 
Big bank x crisis    0.474***  0.474***  0.380***  0.380*** 
   (3.861) (3.842) (3.684) (3.653) 
Control variables        
Foreign  funding  L  -0.081 -0.082 -0.066 -0.063 
    (-0.635) (-0.642) (-0.513) (-0.484) 
Foreign funding x crisis    0.811  0.807  0.685  0.666 
   (1.524) (1.520) (1.275) (1.244) 
Change in uninsured deposits  L  0.037  0.037     
   (0.649)  (0.649)     
Change in total deposits  L      0.047  0.039 
       (0.840)  (0.740) 
Premium paid on deposits  D  -0.777  -1.007  -0.808  -1.199 
    (-0.534) (-0.704) (-0.563) (-0.840) 
Equity  ratio  L  0.318 0.318 0.283 0.277 
   (1.580) (1.575) (1.433) (1.404) 
Low quality loans  L  0.029  0.026  -0.296  -0.339 
   (0.048)  (0.044)  (-0.512)  (-0.588) 
Liquidity L  0.007  0.006  -0.006  -0.010 
   (0.105)  (0.092)  (-0.095)  (-0.149) 
Regional economic activity    0.171  0.184  -0.013  0.056 
   (0.503)  (0.532)  (-0.046)  (0.193) 
Equity ratio x crisis    -0.832  -0.830  -1.083*  -1.076* 
    (-1.326) (-1.325) (-1.739) (-1.726) 
Low quality loans x crisis    -0.789  -0.790  -1.044  -0.992 
    (-0.213) (-0.214) (-0.292) (-0.278) 
Liquidity x crisis    0.410  0.410  0.395  0.394 
   (1.130) (1.129) (1.096) (1.089) 
Constant    0.060 0.059 0.171 0.209 
   (0.328) (0.328) (1.002) (1.258) 
Observations    858 858 858 858 
R-squared    0.108  0.091  
F    4.723 4.700 3.216 3.203 
F_p    . 2.53e-08 . 2.54e-05 
hansen    . 44.27 . 42.62 
hansenp    . 1 . 1 






Table 7 – Deposit concentration 
This table shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) for the change in uninsuredand total deposits 
using the pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and (one-step) system GMM estimators. In the GMM 
regressions, we allow all variables to be only sequentially exogenous, employing suitable lagged values as 
their instruments, except for the following regressors, which are assumed to be strictly exogenous: time 
dummies; Regional economic activity; Big Bank dummy; and Big Bank x Crisis. Coefficient estimates and 
autocorrelation/heteroskedasticity-robust t-tests are shown in parentheses. Estimates for the time dummies 
and mechanical change in deposits (see Appendix) are omitted. D stands for first difference and L stands 
for first lag. Variables interacted with the crisis dummy are lagged according to the variable that appears 
without interaction (for example, equity ratio x crisis is the interaction of the crisis dummy with the first 
lag of the equity ratio, since equity ratio, by itself, is also in first lag).  *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
    Uninsured  Deposits Total  Deposits 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    OLS GMM-Sys OLS GMM-Sys 
Variables of interest        
Crisis dummy      -0.426    -0.453* 
     (-1.627)  (-1.694) 
Size   -0.006 -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 
    (-0.598) (-0.618) (-0.968) (-0.970) 
Big  bank  dummy   -0.033 -0.033 -0.031 -0.031 
    (-0.850) (-0.841) (-0.858) (-0.851) 
Big bank x crisis    0.396***  0.393***  0.261**  0.259** 
   (2.673) (2.648) (2.070) (2.052) 
Control variables        
Deposit  concentration  L  -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 
    (-1.254) (-1.269) (-1.234) (-1.244) 
Deposit concentration x crisis   -0.012 -0.013 -0.021 -0.022 
    (-0.594) (-0.625) (-1.062) (-1.081) 
Change in uninsured deposits  L  0.040  0.038     
   (0.686)  (0.657)     
Change in total deposits  L      0.049  0.050 
       (0.866)  (0.866) 
Premium paid on deposits  D  -0.832  -1.373  -0.868  -1.358 
    (-0.575) (-0.954) (-0.608) (-0.952) 
Equity ratio  L  0.352*  0.348*  0.311  0.309 
   (1.686) (1.666) (1.512) (1.502) 
Low  quality  loans  L  -0.232 -0.257 -0.546 -0.550 
    (-0.373) (-0.414) (-0.937) (-0.945) 
Liquidity  L  -0.004 -0.007 -0.018 -0.019 
    (-0.062) (-0.106) (-0.264) (-0.288) 
Regional  economic  activity    0.259 0.299 0.087 0.099 
   (0.769) (0.880) (0.318) (0.355) 
Equity  ratio  x  crisis   -0.413 -0.399 -0.530 -0.523 
    (-0.582) (-0.563) (-0.749) (-0.742) 
Low quality loans x crisis    -3.019  -3.037  -3.929  -3.947 
    (-0.735) (-0.740) (-0.983) (-0.989) 
Liquidity  x  crisis    0.354 0.351 0.314 0.312 
   (0.920) (0.915) (0.842) (0.838) 
Constant    -0.318 0.100 -0.250 0.200 
   (-0.998) (0.541) (-0.796) (1.138) 
Observations    858 858 858 858 
R-squared    0.105  0.088  
F    5.294 5.475 4.035 3.975 
F-p    . 2.35e-09 . 1.07e-06 
Hansen    . 47.67 . 55.31 
Hansen-p    . 1 . 1 





Table 8 – Reliance on institutional investors for funding 
This table shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) for the change in uninsured and total 
deposits using the pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and (one-step) system GMM estimators. In the 
GMM regressions, we allow all variables to be only sequentially exogenous, employing suitable lagged 
values as their instruments, except for the following regressors, which are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous: time dummies; Regional economic activity; Big Bank dummy; and Big Bank x Crisis. 
Coefficient estimates and autocorrelation/heteroskedasticity-robust t-tests are shown in parentheses. 
Estimates for the time dummies and mechanical change in deposits (see Appendix) are omitted. D stands 
for first difference and L stands for first lag. Variables interacted with the crisis dummy are lagged 
according to the variable that appears without interaction (for example, equity ratio x crisis is the 
interaction of the crisis dummy with the first lag of the equity ratio, since equity ratio, by itself, is also in 
first lag).  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
    Uninsured  Deposits Total  Deposits 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    OLS GMM-Sys OLS GMM-Sys 
Variables of interest        
Crisis  dummy    -0.352** -0.353** -0.298** -0.300** 
    (-2.502) (-2.511) (-2.141) (-2.151) 
Size   -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 
    (-0.608) (-0.607) (-0.959) (-0.958) 
Big bank dummy    -0.000  0.000  -0.002  -0.002 
   (-0.007) (0.004) (-0.071) (-0.059) 
Big bank x crisis    0.381***  0.381***  0.292***  0.292*** 
   (3.594) (3.560) (3.361) (3.325) 
Control variables        
Reliance on institutional 
investors 
L  -0.193 -0.196 -0.145 -0.148 
    (-1.215) (-1.229) (-0.888) (-0.904) 
Reliance on inst. investors x 
crisis 
  -2.884*** -2.876*** -2.867*** -2.859*** 
    (-6.277) (-6.283) (-6.252) (-6.259) 
Change in uninsured deposits  L  0.044  0.045     
   (0.764)  (0.768)     
Change in total deposits  L      0.055  0.055 
       (0.970)  (0.972) 
Premium paid on deposits  D  -0.648  -1.054  -0.676  -1.114 
    (-0.447) (-0.741) (-0.474) (-0.792) 
Equity  ratio  L  0.336 0.335 0.289 0.288 
   (1.657) (1.649) (1.466) (1.457) 
Low quality loans  L  0.269  0.267  -0.090  -0.093 
   (0.469)  (0.466)  (-0.162)  (-0.166) 
Liquidity  L  -0.005 -0.006 -0.015 -0.017 
    (-0.065) (-0.083) (-0.219) (-0.239) 
Regional economic activity    0.392  0.398  0.193  0.202 
   (1.286) (1.278) (0.769) (0.785) 
Equity ratio x crisis    0.945  0.943  0.648  0.647 
   (1.458) (1.459) (1.023) (1.023) 
Low quality loans x crisis    0.105  0.105  -0.031  -0.030 
   (0.053)  (0.053)  (-0.016)  (-0.015) 
Liquidity x crisis    0.467*  0.465*  0.449*  0.448* 
   (1.813) (1.809) (1.785) (1.780) 
Constant    0.126 0.127 0.230 0.231 
   (0.703) (0.713) (1.345) (1.353) 
Observations    852 852 852 852 
R-squared    0.132  0.115  
F    13.17 13.26 14.35 14.52 
F-p    . 0 . 0 
Hansen    . 50.42 . 44.62 
Hansen-p    . 1 . 1 




Table 9 – The effect of government-owned banks 
This table shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) for the change in uninsured and total 
deposits using the pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and (one-step) system GMM estimators. In the 
GMM regressions, we allow all variables to be only sequentially exogenous, employing suitable lagged 
values as their instruments, except for the following regressors, which are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous: time dummies; Regional economic activity; Big Bank dummy; and Big Bank x Crisis. 
Coefficient estimates and autocorrelation/heteroskedasticity-robust t-tests are shown in parentheses. 
Estimates for the time dummies and MechChange (see Appendix) are omitted. D stands for first 
difference and L stands for first lag. Variables interacted with the crisis dummy are lagged according to 
the variable that appears without interaction (for example, equity ratio x crisis is the interaction of the 
crisis dummy with the first lag of the equity ratio, since equity ratio, by itself, is also in first lag).  *, ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
    Uninsured  Deposits Total  Deposits 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    OLS GMM-Sys OLS GMM-Sys 
Variables of interest        
Crisis dummy   -0.268 -0.268 -0.217 -0.218 
    (-1.588) (-1.590) (-1.281) (-1.284) 
Size   0.000  0.000  -0.003  -0.003 
   (0.021)  (0.021)  (-0.360)  (-0.358) 
Big bank dummy    -0.010  -0.010  -0.011  -0.011 
    (-0.322) (-0.312) (-0.364) (-0.351) 
Big bank x crisis    0.417***  0.417***  0.328***  0.328*** 
   (3.581) (3.568) (3.236) (3.223) 
Control variables        
Government-ownedbank 
dummy 
 0.001  0.001 -0.023 -0.023 
   (0.041)  (0.052)  (-1.206)  (-1.193) 
Government-owned bank x 
crisis 
 0.166  0.165 0.180*  0.180* 
   (1.652) (1.656) (1.962) (1.966) 
Change in uninsured deposits  L  0.037  0.036     
   (0.637)  (0.612)     
Change in total deposits  L      0.047  0.046 
       (0.839)  (0.802) 
Premium paid on deposits  D  -0.763  -1.014  -0.768  -1.055 
    (-0.528) (-0.724) (-0.539) (-0.757) 
Equity  ratio  L  0.319 0.319 0.265 0.266 
   (1.581) (1.583) (1.362) (1.364) 
Low quality loans  L  0.086  0.080  -0.079  -0.086 
   (0.139)  (0.129)  (-0.129)  (-0.142) 
Liquidity  L  0.010 0.009 0.019 0.019 
   (0.131) (0.124) (0.263) (0.256) 
Regional economic activity    0.321  0.324  0.161  0.165 
   (0.994) (0.980) (0.604) (0.606) 
Equity ratio x crisis    -0.460  -0.461  -0.729  -0.730 
    (-0.654) (-0.657) (-1.055) (-1.058) 
Low quality loans x crisis    -3.148  -3.139  -3.340  -3.328 
    (-0.826) (-0.824) (-0.898) (-0.895) 
Liquidity x crisis    0.247  0.246  0.221  0.219 
   (0.601) (0.599) (0.541) (0.537) 
Constant    0.036 0.037 0.139 0.140 
   (0.197) (0.203) (0.813) (0.821) 
Observations    858 858 858 858 
R-squared    0.104  0.087  
F    4.570 4.540 3.617 3.567 
F-p    . 7.72e-08 . 6.54e-06 
Hansen    . 54.61 . 54.39 
Hansen-p    . 1 . 1 




Table 10 – The effect on big government-owned banks (excluding privately-owned banks from the 
sample) 
This table shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) for the change in uninsured and total 
deposits using the pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and (one-step) system GMM estimators. In the 
GMM regressions, we allow all variables to be only sequentially exogenous, employing suitable lagged 
values as their instruments, except for the following regressors, which are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous: time dummies; Regional economic activity; Big Government-Owned Bank; and Big 
Government-Owned Bank x Crisis. Coefficient estimates and autocorrelation/heteroskedasticity-robust t-
tests are shown in parentheses. Estimates for the time dummies and MechChange (see Appendix) are 
omitted. D stands for first difference and L stands for first lag. Variables interacted with the crisis dummy 
are lagged according to the variable that appears without interaction (for example, equity ratio x crisis is 
the interaction of the crisis dummy with the first lag of the equity ratio, since equity ratio, by itself, is also 
in first lag).  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
    Uninsured  Deposits Total  Deposits 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    OLS GMM-Sys OLS GMM-Sys 
Variables of interest        
Crisis dummy    -0.278 -0.299* -0.226  -0.226 
   (-1.586) (-1.806) (-1.281) (-1.292) 
Size   0.001 0.001 -0.003  -0.003 
   (0.122) (0.105) (-0.290)  (-0.289) 
Big government-owned bank 
dummy 
  -0.024 -0.023 -0.019 -0.019 
   (-0.724) (-0.713) (-0.620) (-0.602) 
Big  gov. bank x crisis    0.455** 0.457** 0.342** 0.342** 
   (2.314) (2.286) (2.136) (2.101) 
Control Variables        
Change in uninsured deposits  L  0.045 0.040    
   (0.733) (0.674)    
Change in total deposits  L      0.056 0.056 
       (0.948) (0.921) 
Premium paid on deposits  D  -0.832 -1.352 -0.825 -1.272 
   (-0.552) (-0.913) (-0.553) (-0.866) 
Equity ratio  L  0.321 0.318 0.285 0.284 
   (1.588) (1.571) (1.432) (1.428) 
Low quality loans  L  0.076 0.053 -0.252  -0.256 
   (0.129) (0.091) (-0.442)  (-0.452) 
Liquidity L  0.009 0.007 -0.004  -0.005 
   (0.135) (0.104) (-0.058)  (-0.073) 
Regional economic activity    0.252 0.283 0.049 0.052 
   (0.770) (0.854) (0.181) (0.189) 
Equity ratio x crisis    -0.699 -0.698 -0.972 -0.975 
   (-1.039) (-1.043) (-1.474) (-1.485) 
Low quality loans x crisis    -1.701 -1.684 -1.786 -1.782 
   (-0.445) (-0.443) (-0.480) (-0.480) 
Liquidity x crisis    0.402 0.396 0.394 0.391 
   (1.021) (1.009) (1.016) (1.010) 
Constant   0.040 0.062 0.153 0.156 
   (0.218) (0.343) (0.875) (0.891) 
        
Observations   776 776 776 776 
R-squared   0.109  0.095  
F   6.438 5.893 5.506 5.502 
F-p   . 2.87e-09 . 1.08e-08 
Hansen   . 47.68 . 44.31 
Hansen-p   . 1 . 1 
# of cross sections     67  67 
45 
Table 11 – The effect on big privately-owned banks (excluding government-owned banks from the 
sample) 
This table shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) for the change in uninsured and total 
deposits using the pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and (one-step) system GMM estimators. In the 
GMM regressions, we allow all variables to be only sequentially exogenous, employing suitable lagged 
values as their instruments, except for the following regressors, which are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous: time dummies; Regional economic activity; Big Government-Owned Bank; and Big 
Government-Owned Bank x Crisis. Coefficient estimates and autocorrelation/heteroskedasticity-robust t-
tests are shown in parentheses. Estimates for the time dummies and MechChange (see Appendix) are 
omitted. D stands for first difference and L stands for first lag. Variables interacted with the crisis dummy 
are lagged according to the variable that appears without interaction (for example, equity ratio x crisis is 
the interaction of the crisis dummy with the first lag of the equity ratio, since equity ratio, by itself, is also 
in first lag).  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
  
    Uninsured  Deposits Total  Deposits 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    OLS GMM-Sys OLS GMM-Sys 
Variables of interest        
Crisis dummy    -0.281 -0.283 -0.230 -0.232 
   (-1.592) (-1.602) (-1.294) (-1.305) 
Size   0.000 0.000 -0.003  -0.003 
   (0.034) (0.037) (-0.372)  (-0.368) 
Big private bank dummy    -0.007 -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 
   (-0.204) (-0.191) (-0.308) (-0.295) 
Big  private bank x crisis    0.451*** 0.450*** 0.380*** 0.379*** 
   (3.885) (3.882) (3.800) (3.797) 
Control Variables        
Change in uninsured deposits  L  0.039 0.038    
   (0.671) (0.640)    
Change in total deposits  L      0.051 0.049 
       (0.892) (0.855) 
Premium paid on deposits  D  -0.786 -1.193 -0.800 -1.230 
   (-0.539) (-0.841) (-0.555) (-0.872) 
Equity ratio  L  0.314 0.314 0.281 0.281 
   (1.581) (1.579) (1.437) (1.435) 
Low quality loans  L  0.111 0.105 -0.232  -0.240 
   (0.193) (0.183) (-0.414)  (-0.429) 
Liquidity L  0.014 0.013 -0.002  -0.002 
   (0.204) (0.192) (-0.024)  (-0.036) 
Regional economic activity    0.252 0.266 0.053 0.066 
   (0.770) (0.797) (0.196) (0.240) 
Equity ratio x crisis    -0.687 -0.687 -0.964 -0.963 
   (-1.034) (-1.038) (-1.478) (-1.483) 
Low quality loans x crisis    -1.602 -1.592 -1.701 -1.691 
   (-0.420) (-0.419) (-0.459) (-0.457) 
Liquidity x crisis    0.455 0.453 0.436 0.434 
   (1.127) (1.123) (1.092) (1.088) 
Constant   0.039 0.039 0.154 0.155 
   (0.215) (0.217) (0.901) (0.905) 
        
Observations   829 829 829 829 
R-squared   0.101  0.086  
F   5.137 5.250 4.230 4.228 
F-p   . 1.06e-08 . 7.30e-07 
Hansen   . 50.19 . 54.36 
Hansen-p   . 1 . 1 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13 – Change in deposits, post-financial crisis and big banks 
This table shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) for the change in uninsured and total 
deposits using the pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and (one-step) system GMM estimators. In the 
GMM regressions, we allow all variables to be only sequentially exogenous, employing suitable lagged 
values as their instruments, except for the following regressors, which are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous: time dummies; Regional economic activity; Big Bank dummy; Big Bank x Crisis and Big 
Bank x Post-Crisis. Coefficient estimates and autocorrelation/heteroskedasticity-robust t-tests are shown 
in parentheses. Estimates for the time dummies and mechanical change in deposits (see Appendix) are 
omitted. D stands for first difference and L stands for first lag. Variables interacted with the crisis dummy 
and the post-crisis dummy are lagged according to the variable that appears without interaction (for 
example, equity ratio x crisis is the interaction of the crisis dummy with the first lag of the equity ratio, 
since equity ratio, by itself, is also in first lag).  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
 
    Uninsured  Deposits Total  Deposits 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    OLS GMM-Sys OLS GMM-Sys 
Variables of interest        
Crisis  dummy    -0.191 -0.398*** -0.142  -0.324** 
    (-1.438) (-2.989) (-1.086) (-2.429) 
Post-Crisis  dummy   0.119 -0.088 0.054 -0.128 
    (1.071) (-0.878) (0.509) (-1.398) 
Size   -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 -0.012 
    (-1.016) (-1.014) (-1.366) (-1.364) 
Big  bank  dummy    0.024 0.024 0.019 0.019 
   (0.729) (0.735) (0.570) (0.577) 
Big bank x crisis    0.366***  0.366***  0.280***  0.281*** 
   (3.485) (3.454) (3.236) (3.203) 
Big bank x post-crisis    -0.150*  -0.149*  -0.134**  -0.133* 
    (-1.876) (-1.859) (-1.994) (-1.971) 
Control variables        
Rel.on institutional investors  L  -0.276  -0.279*  -0.282*  -0.285* 
    (-1.657) (-1.673) (-1.743) (-1.761) 
Rel. on inst. investors x crisis    -2.811***  -2.802***  -2.736***  -2.728*** 
    (-5.990) (-5.993) (-5.854) (-5.856) 
Rel. on inst. investors x post-
crisis 
L 0.976** 0.981**  1.474***  1.479*** 
   (2.526) (2.540) (3.506) (3.522) 
Premium paid on deposits  D  -0.646  -1.052  -0.702  -1.142 
    (-0.442) (-0.734) (-0.488) (-0.806) 
Equity  ratio  L  0.247 0.246 0.185 0.183 
   (1.163) (1.154) (0.922) (0.912) 
Low  quality  loans  L  -0.087 -0.091 -0.470 -0.474 
    (-0.151) (-0.157) (-0.832) (-0.839) 
Liquidity L  0.011  0.010  -0.016  -0.018 
   (0.159)  (0.136)  (-0.241)  (-0.267) 
Regional  economic  activity   0.376 0.382 0.162 0.172 
   (1.319) (1.314) (0.688) (0.711) 
Liquidity  x  crisis   0.451* 0.450* 0.449* 0.448* 
   (1.702) (1.699) (1.719) (1.715) 
Constant    0.026 0.234 0.136  0.318* 
   (0.163) (1.310) (0.892) (1.918) 
Lagged dependent variable  L  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Other interactions controls x 
crisis 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Other interactions controls x 
post-crisis 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations    852 852 852 852 
R-squared    0.148  0.137  
F    13.10 13.17 14.14 14.20 
F-p    . 0 . 0 
Hansen    . 47.94 . 41.68 
49 
Hansen-p    . 1 . 1 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Operational Definitions of Variables Used in the Tests 
1 – Independent Variables 
∆         ,   is the change in deposits of bank i in period t, measured by the first 
difference of the log of deposits. 
The database from the FGC provides the amount of insured and uninsured deposits. 
2 – Dependent Variables 
Our right-hand-side variables are defined as below. Some are used in levels 
(contemporaneous and/or lagged) and others are used in first differences, as explained 
in section I. 
 
2.1 Risk 
The bank-specific risk indicators chosen are commonly used in the literature. The 
operational definition of all the variables is described below. 
Equity: we measure the ratio of equity to total assets to examine capital adequacy. 
Low quality loans: the assessment of the quality of assets can be made using several 
indicators. To a great extent, empirical studies use the ratio of nonperforming loans and 
total assets. We prefer a more forward looking metric: the ratio of low quality loans to 
total assets. Brazilian banks must rate their credit operations in an ascending order of 
risk, on levels AA, A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H and report the volume of credit in each of 
these ratings in their financial statements. Low quality loans are those that fall into one 
of the ratings E to H. Resolution 2.682 from the Brazilian National Monetary Council 
states that loans due for more than 90 days should be rated E or worse. 
Liquidity: We use as a proxy for liquidity (cash + tradable securities) / assets. 
 
2.2 Control Variables 
Size: we measure size as the natural log of assets. We include this variable as a 
fundamental in order to disentangle the pure effect of size on deposits from the special 
characteristics that may cause a bank to be too big to fail. 
Regional economic activity: although bank legislation allows banks to open branches 
and have operations throughout all Brazilian states, many banks focus on specific states 
to do business. Deposits may thus be influenced by the economic activity of individual 
states. We use data from the retail sales survey done by the Brazilian Institute for 
Geography and Statistics (IBGE, for its acronym in Portuguese), which provides the 
growth in retail sales for each state of the federation as well as the resulting national 
growth in retail sales
1. This is the most used indicator of regional economic activity in 
Brazil. To assign a state to each bank, we use the following procedure: if a bank has 
branches in more than 10 states
2 and no single state accounts for more than 50% of its 
                                                            
1 The index is released on a monthly basis. We use the 12-month compound growth in retail sales (which does not 
need to be adjusted for seasonality) for June and December to match with the rest of our data.  
2 Brazil has 27 states. 
53 
branches, we consider it a nationwide bank, and use the national index. Otherwise we 
use the index for the state where the bank has more branches. Thus: 
                           ,  is the change in retail sales index of the state in which 
the bank has more branches (considers heterogeneous macro-effects over depositors-
base). 
Exposure on Loans: loans are classified into 8 different categories: 1) trade finance 
(import and export); 2) short-term (less than 12 months) loans   to non-financial 
companies; 3) agricultural; 4) real estate; 5) consumer goods (including auto vehicles); 
6) infrastructure; 7) personal (loans made to individuals without specifying a particular 
purpose); 8) others. Exposure to each of these classes of loans is measured as the ratio 
between the amount of loans in that class and total assets. For example, exposure to 
trade finance is measured as the amount of loans qualified as trade finance and total 
assets. We are especially interested in classes 1 (trade finance) and 2 (working capital). 
Trade finance loans are very collateralized by import/export contracts, have typically 
very low delinquency rate and loss given default and are thus expected to be very safe 
during the crisis. On the other hand, working capital loans have typically low collateral 
and are mostly issued by small and middle firms (since in Brazil these firms have little 
access to long term debt markets) and held to maturity by the lender bank (instead of 
being securitized and traded in the secondary market) and thus we can expect these 
loans to be riskier during the financial crisis. 
Deposit concentration: a bank with a larger depositor base is naturally more diversified 
than another that relies on few depositors to fund its assets. In addition, deposit 
concentration may create incentives for depositors to “run first” during periods in which 
informational asymmetry is higher. Deposit concentration is measured as the portion of 
a bank’s asset being funded by each depositor on average, i.e., total deposits / (total 
assets * number of depositors) in each semester. 
Reliance on institutional investors: Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2010) find evidence 
that the behavior of institutional investors depends on whether they are surrounded by 
other institutional investors or by retail investors. We use the ratio between the amount 
of certificates of deposit held by institutional investors and total assets to account for the 
reliance on institutional investors. 
Reliance on foreign funds: banks that rely on foreign funds may be more likely to 
struggle to obtain funding during episodes that reduce the amount of foreign capital to 
emerging markets in general or to Brazil in particular. We define the reliance on foreign 
funds as the proportion of assets being funded by sources obtained abroad, i.e. total 
foreign funds / total assets. 
Mechanical Change in deposits: We also compute for each bank the change occurred 
in insured and uninsured deposits due to the change in the amount insured in September 
2006             . This computation is based on an unique bank level data on the 
number of depositors and volume of deposits in several different deposit-size brackets 
for all Brazilian banking firms. Since the change took place in September 2006, we 
compute, based on the data of Jun/2006 the amount of uninsured deposits that became 
insured due to the simple fact that the amount insured was increased. Had we neglected 
this change, we would end up with a measurement error in our left-hand-side variables 
(change in insured deposits and change in uninsured deposits) in the period Dec/2006, 
since these are not changes derived from depositors moving their resources from one 
bank to another, which is ultimately what we want to measure. It is also important that, 
since the change in the amount insured affects each bank differently (because they have 
54 
different depositor profiles) it is not simply a change in level that could be captured by 
time fixed effects. As such, in order to correct this measurement error, we create a 
variable that assumes the value of the change in uninsured deposits due to the increase 
in the amount insured in Dec/2006 and 0 in all other periods
3. We create an analogous 
variable for insured deposits. 
 
2.3 Identification variables 
We use two different variables that allow us to perform our identification strategy. 
Big Bank: This is a dummy that assumes 1 for the banks that could be perceived as too 
big to fail and 0 otherwise. As explained above, these are the eight largest banks up to 
Jun/2008. In Dec/2008 there are six banks, because there were two mergers between 
banks belonging to this group in the second semester of 2008. The reasons for choosing 
these eight banks are described in section I. 
Crisis: This is a Crisis dummy that assumes 1 for period ending in Dec/2008 and 0 in 
all other periods. 
Post-Crisis: This is an indicator of the period that followed the crisis. It assumes 1 for 
periods ending in Jun/2009 and Dec/2009 and 0 in all other periods. 
 
                                                            
3 As expected, the coefficient of this variable is equal to 1 in our regressions, with significance of less 
than 1%. 
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